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Introduction
The doctrine of  Crown act of  state,
1 which permits the Crown to resist claims in tort
brought against it on the basis that the action giving rise to the allegedly tortious act
constituted an ‘act of  state’, has never enjoyed any great clarity.2 No wonder: it has been for
much of  its history little more than an extrapolation from a small number of  disparate and
unusual cases, some of  them barely reasoned and most of  which belong to a very different
constitutional era.3 The recent judgment of  the Court of  Appeal in the joined appeals in
Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of  Defence and Rahmatullah v Ministry of  Defence,4 together with the
first instance decisions of  Leggatt J in each case,5 amounts to a much-needed clarification
and modernisation of  a doctrine which stands as one of  the constitution’s more uncertain
and anachronistic elements. This article maps the effect of  these recent decisions on the
substance of  the doctrine, arguing that not only have they deprived the doctrine of  much
of  its assumed effect but that they in fact demonstrate that the doctrine is really no such
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* I thank Mark Telford and Marta Iljadica for their comments on earlier versions of  the present work. My
thoughts on this question were heavily influenced by a number of  long conversations with Matt Nicholson
on this and related issues and I thank him for his time and insight.
1 Alternatively, ‘British’ or ‘domestic’ act of  state. The doctrine in question is labelled as such so as to distinguish
it from the separate doctrine now known as ‘foreign act of  state’. On the relation between the two, see most
recently Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of  State for Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [375]: ‘The two principles
[foreign act of  state and crown act of  state] are distinct and, in our view, have different rationales.’ On foreign
act of  state, see the recent case of  Belhaj v Straw [2014] EWCA Civ 1394 and, discussing it in the context of
the doctrine’s development, Matthew Nicholson, ‘The Political Unconscious of  the English Foreign Act of
State and Non-Justiciability Doctrine(s)’ (2015) 64 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 743. One of
the cases discussed in the present work – Rahmatullah v Ministry of  Defence [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB) – also
raised issues of  foreign act of  state. Those issues were separated out and joined with Belhaj on appeal to the
Supreme Court, with argument taking place in November 2015.
2 Perhaps the most impressive attempt to make sense of  the issue is Amanda Perreau-Saussine, ‘British Acts of
State in English Courts’ (2008) 78 British Yearbook of  International Law 176.
3 Amongst them the following: Buron v Denman (1848) 2 Exch 167, 154 ER 450; Walker v Baird [1892] AC 491;
Poll v Lord Advocate (1899) 1 F 823, (1897) 5 SLT 167; Johnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262; Nissan v Attorney General
[1970] AC 179.
4 [2015] EWCA Civ 843.
5 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of  Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB); Yunus Rahmatullah v Ministry of  Defence [2014]
EWHC 3846 (QB).
thing. It has crumbled under scrutiny and talk of  it, which obscures rather than illuminates
the key questions about the role of  the courts in relation to the Crown’s torts abroad, should
now be abandoned. 
Some background
Crown Act of  state reflects certain background features of  the historical and
contemporary constitutional order. The first is the exclusion of  the Crown’s prerogative
powers from the jurisdiction of  the courts, which in the past would review the existence
and scope of  the power in question – and so establish whether what had been done by
the executive was indeed within the prerogative6 – but would not examine the use to
which such powers were put.7 The second is the rule – one of  the ‘legal prerogatives’ of
the Crown – that ‘the King can do no wrong’, glossed by Chitty as meaning that ‘his
Majesty, individually and personally, and in his natural capacity . . . is not amenable to any
other earthly power or jurisdiction . . . The law supposes it impossible that the King
himself  can act unlawfully or improperly.’8 The effect of  this, said Chitty, was that, at least
since the reign of  Edward I, ‘the Crown has been free from any action at the suit of  its
subjects’.9 The common law recognised instead in the context of  certain claims (including
those relating to individual property rights) a mode of  proceeding against the Crown
known as a ‘petition of  right’ which was codified and regularised by a statute of  1860.10
A petition of  right was severely limited in its scope. First, permission to bring a petition
was required, though in practice not refused where a prima facie case was established.
Moreover, it was ‘a fatal bar to the success of  a petition of  right to allege a tortious act
on the part of  the Crown . . . for such an allegation violated the rule that the Crown could
do no wrong, and that rule has not been abrogated either at common law or by the
Petitions of  Right Act, 1860’.11 Where a petition of  right was unavailable, an alternative
would be to bring a personal action against any Crown servant who could be identified as
responsible for the wrongful act, reflecting the claim that: ‘although in the eyes of  his
courts the king can do no wrong, a wrong apparently done by the king could be attributed
to his servants, and that those servants, however, senior, were answerable not solely to the
king but also to the courts’.12 The opportunity to bring an action against the Crown’s
servants or agents in person – though the basis of  some of  the common law’s most
celebrated decisions protecting individual liberty13 – was subject to the possibility that the
Crown would ratify or adopt the action of  its servants (if  it had not authorised it in
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6 See e.g. Coke in The Case of  Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, 77 ER 1352: ‘the King hath no prerogative but
that which the law of  the land allows him’. 
7 See e.g. China Navigation Company v Attorney General [1932] 2 KB 197.
8 Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of  the Prerogatives of  the Crown: And the Relative Duties and Rights of  the Subject
(J Butterworth & Son 1820) 5.
9 Ibid 339.
10 Petitions of  Right Act 1860.
11 E C S Wade, ‘Liability in Tort of  the Central Government of  the United Kingdom’ (1954) 29 New York
University Law Review 1416, 1418. The case usually taken as establishing that rule is Viscount Canterbury v
Attorney General (1842) 1 Ph 306, though Perreau-Saussine (n 2) 230 says that the justification offered by the
judge in the case, Lord Lyndhurst LC, for the relevant conclusion is ‘dubious because so confused’. See also
Tobin v R (1864) 16 CBNS 310 and Feather v R (1865) 6 B & S 257.
12 Perreau-Saussine (n 2) 229. 
13 Most obviously, Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Trials 1029. This possibility was often exploited by the
Crown in order to undercut its own immunity: it would nominate a servant against whom an action in tort
might be brought and indemnify that person for damages and costs. For the deprecation and then rejection
of  this practice by the courts, see Adams v Naylor [1946] AC 543 and Royston v Cavey [1947] KB 204.
advance), leaving only the (empty) possibility of  an action against the Crown itself  or
some extrajudicial remedy.14 Both the non-reviewability of  the prerogative generally and
the specific immunity of  the Crown in its own courts must be borne in mind when
considering the nature and historical operation and development of  the doctrine of
Crown act of  state. Both, however, have been significantly eroded – the former, as we
shall see, by a series of  decisions of  the English courts over the last 30 or so years; the
latter by the enactment of  the Crown Proceedings Act 1947.15 These developments call
into question the traditional understanding of  Crown act of  state.
A third contextual factor is choice of  laws. Previously, a tort committed abroad could
be the basis of  a claim in the English courts only if  the conduct giving rise to it was
recognised as a tort by both English law and the law of  the jurisdiction in which it
occurred – this was the ‘double actionability’ rule.16 Since the enactment of  the Private
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, however, the general rule is that, for the
purposes of  tort, ‘the applicable law is the law of  the country in which the events
constituting the tort or delict in question occur’.17 Given that the doctrine of  Crown act
of  state does not apply to actions carried out in Britain (with the possible but now
perhaps unlikely exception of  those perpetrated upon hostile aliens),18 the effect will
normally be that the law governing situations in which the doctrine is invoked will be
foreign law, the content of  which must be proved as a question of  fact. The applicability
of  foreign law to the relevant facts does not, though, preclude the pleading of  Crown act
of  state: the doctrine is a rule of  procedure and so ‘its availability is governed by English
law as the law of  the forum’.19 This presumes that England is in fact the forum in which
the relevant claims are brought. It usually will be, not least because the relevant claims are
being brought against a minister of  the Crown. A successful plea of  Crown act of  state,
in either of  the two forms which the doctrine takes, will not prevent the claim thereby
repelled from being brought in another jurisdiction: it is likely, however, that such a course
of  action is, for any number of  reasons, substantially less attractive than is proceeding in
an English court.
The dualism of Crown act of state
Though, considered holistically, the doctrine of  Crown act of  state is much diminished
by them, a key feature of  the most recent round of  judgments is the reaffirmation, in the
face of  direct challenge, of  the doctrine’s dualism: the existence within it of  two separate
rules, one which identifies certain matters as non-justiciable and so prevents their
consideration by English courts altogether, and another which provides a defence to a
claim in tort arising out of  conduct which the courts would otherwise be willing and able
The vanishing law of Crown act of state 369
14 Buron v Denman (1848) 2 Exch 167.
15 Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s 2. On that Act, see generally Glanville Williams, Crown Proceedings (Stevens &
Sons 1948). For an account of  the debates leading to its enactment, see Joseph M Jacob, ‘The Debates behind
an Act: Crown Proceedings Reform 1920–1947’ [1992] Public Law 452.
16 On which see Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 and Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356. The rule was abolished by
s 10 of  the Private Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995.
17 Private Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, s 11(1). An exception exists where it is ‘substantially more
appropriate’ for the applicable law to be that of  another country, in which case the law of  that country is
preferred’: Private Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, s 12.
18 Johnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262. 
19 Yunus Rahmatullah v Ministry of  Defence [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [218] (fn). See: Private Law (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1995, s 14(3)(b): ‘[N]othing in this part . . . affects any rules of  evidence, pleading or practice
or authorises questions of  procedure in any proceedings to be determined otherwise than in accordance with
the law of  the forum.’
to consider. The origin of  that dualism is Buron v Denman.20 The defendant (a naval
commander) was tasked by the governor of  Sierra Leone with freeing two British captives
detained as slaves on the Gallinas islands, at the mouth of  the eponymous river.21 In
doing so Denman took possession of  and then destroyed barraccoons (slave huts)
belonging to Buron, a Spanish slave trader, and took Buron’s slaves back to Sierra Leone
to be liberated. All this was the subject of  vast praise from ministers and naval figures.
When Buron sued in trespass, the central question was whether Denman’s conduct could
be ‘justified as an act of  state, done by authority of  the Crown’.22 That is, was the
subsequent ratification of  the act, in terms of  approving letters sent by various secretaries
of  state and the Lord of  the Admiralty upon becoming aware of  it, equivalent to prior
authority? Though the judge whose summing-up is reported, Parke B, was less sure on
this point than his brethren, the majority in the Exchequer Court held in the affirmative,
leaving Buron with a remedy only against the Crown via a petition of  right23 or, in the
alternative, the possibility of  seeking some diplomatic remedy.
The context of  the decision in Buron was such that no enquiry into the concept of  act
of  state, or its significance, was undertaken: what mattered was that Denman’s potential
individual liability was extinguished by the subsequent ratification. It appears that the sole
act of  state case cited in argument was Elphinstone v Bedreechund 24 in which it had been held
that a municipal court had no jurisdiction over the seizure of  property carried out, in
contravention of  the articles of  capitulation, against the governor of  a conquered
fortress: the character of  the seizure was ‘that of  hostile seizure . . . regard being had both
to the time, the place, and the person, and consequently that the Municipal Court had no
jurisdiction to adjudge upon the subject’.25 A series of  nineteenth-century cases before
and after Buron concurred: certain questions were not suitable for consideration in the
domestic courts.26 But, insofar as can be inferred from the brief  discussion of  the point,
it seems that the doctrine of  act of  state does not operate in Buron as it did in Elphinstone.27
Instead, act of  state appears to function as a defence to a claim in tort over which the
courts enjoy rather than abjure jurisdiction: hence Park B’s reference to Denman’s actions
being ‘justified as an act of  state’.28 And, certainly, that is how Buron has come to be treated,
notwithstanding the thinness of  the textual basis of  that conclusion. To the older act of
state rule of  non-justiciability it was taken to have added a second rule: the doctrine had
assumed a dualist nature.
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20 Buron v Denman (1848) 2 Exch 167, 154 ER 450.
21 For a much fuller account of  the background to the case, see Charles Mitchell and Leslie Turano, ‘Buron v
Denman (1848)’ in Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of  Tort (Hart 2010).
22 (1848) 2 Exch 167, 188.
23 Though Perreau-Saussine has neatly demonstrated the uncertainties in the application of  the procedure to
Buron’s case (n 2) 229–32.
24 (1830) 1 Kn 316, 12 ER 340.
25 Ibid 360–61.
26 See e.g. Cook v Sprigg [1899] AC 572, 578: ‘It is a well-established principle of  law that the transactions of
independent States between each other are governed by other laws than those which municipal courts
administer.’
27 Though see Feather v R (1865) 6 B & S 257, 296, where Cockburn CJ takes Buron to show that ‘where an act
injurious to a foreigner, and which might otherwise afford a ground of  action, is done by a British subject,
and the act is adopted by the government of  this country, it becomes the act of  the state, and the private right
of  action becomes merged in the international question which arises between our own government and that
of  the foreigner’.
28 (1848) 2 Exch 167, 187 (emphasis added).
This dualism was observed by Emelyn Wade.29 In a seminal contribution, he noted
that the phrase ‘act of  state’ was most closely associated with the defence available to
Crown servants for criminal30 or tortious actions in certain circumstances (not, famously,
against British subjects for acts done in Britain)31 – a rule evidenced by Buron v Denman
and various cases decided since. However, ‘the narrow application of  the term as a
defence to what would otherwise be a tortious or criminal act does not explain its full
scope’:32 it denoted also a category of  acts not justiciable in domestic (‘municipal’) courts.
Thus, notwithstanding that the Buron rule arose subsequently to the justiciability rule, it
had by the 1930s managed to achieve priority over it. Reasoning inductively from cases of
both types, Wade defined an act of  state as ‘an act of  the Executive as a matter of  policy
performed in the course of  its relations with another state, including its relations with the
subjects of  that state, unless they are temporarily within the allegiance of  the Crown.’33
When Wade’s distinction was taken up and filled out by Lord Mcnair, the defence again
took priority,34 being stated to exist alongside ‘a rule which is wider and more
fundamental, namely, that “those acts of  the Crown which are done under the prerogative
in the sphere of  foreign affairs” . . . cannot form the basis of  an action brought against
the Crown, or its agents or servants, by any person, British or alien, or by any foreign
state, in British municipal tribunals.’35 Note that the phrasing limits the non-justiciability
rule in two ways: it applies to the situations involving (a) the exercise of  the prerogative
and even then only (b) in the realm of  foreign affairs. Where Wade had identified all of
the standard act of  state cases as exemplifying the tort defence, however, Mcnair placed
in that category only Buron v Denman and Johnstone v Pedlar (in which the doctrine did not
apply because the claimant was a friendly alien). Walker v Baird he conceptualised as an
instantiation of  the non-justiciability rule. Though Mcnair admitted that the scope of
both limbs was obscure, as was the relation between them, he took as evidence of  their
distinctiveness the fact that the tort defence, unlike the non-justiciability rule, ‘is not valid
against a British subject’.36 The doctrine’s dualism was accepted by the House of  Lords
in Nissan v Attorney General,37 but only in obiter: the doctrine was of  no application there
because the act in question – the taking of  the plaintiff ’s hotel as headquarters for the
British command in Cyprus – was not itself  an act of  state.38 Not only, therefore, is Buron
a weak authority for the existence of  the tort defence: it was for a long time the only such
authority. The doctrine’s dualism has always rested upon fragile foundations. 
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29 E C S Wade, ‘Act of  State in English Law: Its Relations with International Law’ (1934) 15 British Yearbook
of  International Law 98. An older discussion of  the doctrine is found in William Harrison Moore, Act of  State
in English Law (John Murray 1906).
30 On the application of  the act of  state doctrine to criminal acts, see James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of  the
Criminal Law of  England vol II (Macmillan & Co 1883) 63–64. Given the reconceptualisation of  the tort
defence rule which has taken place in recent years (discussed below), its ability to provide a defence to criminal
acts must be strongly doubted. 
31 A proposition for which Wade cites Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029.
32 Wade (n 29) 99.
33 Ibid 103.
34 Lord Mcnair, International Law Opinions vol I (CUP 1956) 111.
35 Ibid 112. The quoted phrase is from E C S Wade and G Godfrey Phillips, Constitutional Law 4th edn (Longman,
Green & Co 1950) 193.
36 Mcnair (n 34) 116, fn 1.
37 Nissan v Attorney-General [1970] AC 179, 220B–C (Lord Morris) and 231D (Lord Wilberforce).
38 [1970] AC 179, 215G (Lord Morris), 227B (Lord Pearce), 235H (Lord Wilberforce) and 240C–D (Lord
Pearson).
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Before the Court of  Appeal in the joined appeals, the dualism of  Crown act of  state
was directly challenged, as it had been also in the High Court in Rahmatullah. The situation
of  Mr Rahmattullah, originally captured by British forces in Iraq and handed over to
American forces who detained him in Afghanistan, has been the subject of  significant
attention by the English courts.39 He was released from detention in Afghanistan and
returned to Pakistan, his homeland, in June 2014. Crown act of  state becomes relevant in
the context of  private law and Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) claims brought by him
against the Ministry of  Defence and the Foreign Office. For reasons that will be explained
shortly, Rahmatullah sought to argue that there are not – as had been said by Wade and
Mcnair and accepted in Nissan v Attorney General – two limbs to the Crown act of  state
doctrine but only one; that ‘the Crown act of  state doctrine is solely a rule of  justiciability
and there is no separate rule which can provide a defence to a claim in tort’.40 This
involved reconceptualising Buron v Denman, the case taken to evidence the existence of  the
tort defence, as ‘merely an expression of  the non-justiciability rule in a case where the
defendant was an agent of  the Crown, rather than the Crown itself ’.41 It was argued that
the significance of  the post hoc ratification of  Denman’s acts was that those acts were
thereby rendered sovereign acts ‘operating at the international level of  the state’s relations
with a foreign state and its subjects and hence as inherently non-justiciable’.42 If  that was
the case, then the alleged tort defence was simply a misunderstood instantiation of  the
non-justiciability rule rather than something separate from it. If  the non-justiciability rule
did not apply, then nor could – on this reading – the tort defence. 
This monist reading of  the doctrine is attractive: its acceptance would bring clarity and
coherence to a particularly unclear area of  law and, more importantly, involve abandoning
the claim, to which the reading of  Buron which has prevailed throughout the twentieth
century amounts, that the Crown’s say-so is sufficient to give rise to a defence in law to
wrongful conduct upon which the courts are otherwise capable of  adjudicating. What
would seem to be the countervailing cost of  the manoeuvre – the exclusion from the
courts’ jurisdiction altogether of  the matters giving rise to the alleged tort – is not as great
as it initially seems, given the inroads, discussed below, which both the High Court and
the Court of  Appeal accept as having been made into the non-justiciability rule. Crucially,
this submission as to the doctrine’s monism reflects both the general context and the
specific terms of  the decision in Buron better than does most of  the literature (which
accepts the existence of  a separate tort defence), not asking that case to bear a burden
which the very thin treatment of  the matter therein cannot sustain. Given that the
defence in tort which Buron is often taken as evidencing had never since been successfully
pleaded in the English courts, to declare untenable the dominant reading of  the case, and
the doctrinal dualism to which it gives rise, would not have involved contradicting an
established body of  law.
Nevertheless, the monist reading of  the Crown act of  state doctrine was rejected both
in the High Court and again in the Court of  Appeal. Both courts emphasised that the
existence of  the act of  state tort defence and thus the dualism of  the Crown act of  state
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39 For the story of  Rahmatullah’s habeus corpus writ, see Rahmatullah v Secretary of  State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs [2011] EWCA Civ 1540; Rahmatullah v Secretary of  State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
(No. 2) [2012] EWCA Civ 182; and Rahmatullah v Secretary of  State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2)
[2012] UKSC 48.
40 Rahmatullah v Ministry of  Defence [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [201].
41 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [202].
42 Ibid [204]. For the equivalent submission in the Court of  Appeal, see [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [332]–[335].
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doctrine had been widely accepted, in Nissan and elsewhere.43 This is unfortunate – in
Nissan, the act of  state rule at issue was the non-justiciability rule, rather than the tort
defence, and that submission failed. But on the wider point, the judges are correct: the
literature clearly shows that, in the time since it was decided, Buron has had thrust upon
it, consistently if  not unanimously, a meaning which it does not easily bear but which the
courts – or at least the lower courts – are rightly hesitant to overturn altogether.44 In
rejecting the rewriting of  Buron offered here, Leggatt J further observed that act of  state
as a defence to a tort claim is ‘sound in principle and rests on a proper appreciation of
the separation of  powers’.45 That claim played no role in the reasoning of  the Court of
Appeal, which instead emphasised – without explanation or elaboration – that the
doctrine must have two elements because the two rules ‘are applicable in different
circumstances’, a reference (presumably) to the fact that the non-justiciability rule, unlike
the tort defence, applies also to public law claims:46 the distinction which Mcnair
identified – that the non-justiciability rule alone applies to British citizens – seems now
improbable.47 The logic of  this point is dubious: the two rules can have differential
applicability only if  they first exist, and so their differential applicability is not a factor
which can be adduced in favour of  their existence. Nevertheless, in light of  the way in
which the Court of  Appeal’s judgment (re)frames – and, in effect, significantly narrows –
the act of  state tort defence, principle does not count against the rule’s continued
existence as strongly as might otherwise have been the case. For now, it suffices to note
that the opportunity of  bringing coherence to the doctrine by holding it to consist of  a
single rule has twice been rejected, in large part upon the basis of  the untested
assumptions of  a series of  textbook writers. The Supreme Court, when it considers these
issues, would be advised to offer a fuller elaboration of  the point, whether or not it
endorses the Court of  Appeal’s narrowing of  the tort defence. In the meantime, the
doctrine of  Crown act of  state retains its superficial dualism even as its two limbs are
progressively eroded and its coherence as a doctrine is undermined.
The non-justiciability rule
The non-justiciability limb of  Crown act of  state had, before the doctrine’s dualism was
reaffirmed in Rahmatullah, been significantly undercut by the decision of  the High Court
in Serdar Mohammed – the case with which it was later joined on appeal. The claimant had
been captured by British forces in Afghanistan and later transferred into the custody of
the Afghan authorities. He claimed that his detention by the British forces was unlawful
under both Afghan law and the HRA. Leggatt J accepted that the detention was unlawful
from the point of  view of  both Afghan and international law. In determining the
application of  the non-justiciability rule, he first considered the rule’s rationale, adopting
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43 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [208]
44 See also Nissan [1970] AC 179, 220: ‘Though the conception of  an act of  state as illustrated in Buron v Denman
has been so recognised that it cannot now be overthrown I would hope that occasions for dependence on it
as a defence will become increasingly rare.’
45 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [208]
46 Leggatt J In Serdar Mohammed suggests that, although Crown act of  state does not ‘operate in the field of
public law to bar a claim for judicial review’, its non-justiciability limb is ‘similar if  not identical to the rule
that acts of  the Crown which are done under the prerogative in the sphere of  foreign affairs are unreviewable’
[2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [379]. For the reasons given below, this seems to be false: the non-justiciability limb
of  Crown act of  state in effect does apply to public law claims, being simply an instantiation of  the same
general rule of  justiciability as governs (some) uses of  that prerogative. As the Court of  Appeal notes:
‘whether issues are justiciable cannot depend on the nature of  the proceedings’ [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [324].
47 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [397].
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both Elias LJ’s claim in Al-Jedda (No 2) that this is a question about the relationship
between executive government and the courts (‘To what extent and in what circumstances
should the court refuse to hold the executive to account in its dealings with foreign states
or its handling of  foreign relations?’)48 and the idea that the ‘conceptual normative basis’
of  the doctrine lies in the notion of  the separation of  powers.49 The general principle is
that ‘the conduct of  foreign affairs is the province of  the executive arm of  the state and
that the judiciary should not involve itself  in (or bring into jeopardy) the conduct of  such
affairs’.50 Note here that, unlike in Mcnair’s discussion quoted earlier, the concern is
purely with the subject matter of  the power (foreign affairs) rather than its source.
The articulation of  that principle indicates clearly the impossibility of  the non-
justiciability rule working as it did in the (mostly nineteenth-century) cases which
evidence it. Though it would once have been accurate to suggest that English law
excluded altogether judicial oversight of  the executive’s exercise of  the foreign affairs
prerogative (as it did the prerogative as a whole), such a general proposition is no longer
sustainable in light of  a series of  decisions which have brought the prerogative, in both
its primary and secondary forms, within the jurisdiction of  the courts – decisions which,
crucially, post-date the last consideration of  the doctrine of  Crown act of  state by the
highest court.51 Most prominent amongst these is the GCHQ case, which confirmed a
judicial willingness, flashes of  which had already been visible,52 to review not merely the
existence of  prerogative powers but their exercise;53 from there on, prerogative powers
would be excluded from review not on the basis of  their source (which no longer
enjoyed blanket exclusion) but on the basis of  their subject matter.54 Though not listed
by Lord Roskill in GCHQ as one of  the powers the exercise of  which would by virtue
of  its subject matter remain beyond the courts’ reach,55 the foreign affairs prerogative
was identified as such by Lord Fraser.56 The decision of  the House of  Lords in Bancoult
(No 2),57 however, demonstrates, suggests Leggatt J,58 that, as has happened in relation
to other prerogative powers singled out in GCHQ,59 the excluded status of  the foreign
affairs prerogative has itself  been partially eroded. Rather than it being recognised in law
that ‘certain areas of  decision-making by the executive such as foreign policy are “no go”
areas for the courts’,60 the golden rule which now applies to the prerogative is that
reviewability is a function of  the extent to which a particular decision of  the executive
is ‘justiciable’. 
The relevance of  these background shifts is that the broader Crown act of  state rule
– in which it operates as a rule of  non-justiciability which is ‘similar if  not identical to the
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48 Al-Jedda v Secretary of  State for Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 758, [197].
49 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of  Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [373].
50 Ibid [374].
51 Which took place in Nissan v Attorney General [1970] AC 179.
52 R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte Lain [1967] 2 QB 864.
53 Council of  Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
54 Ibid 407 per Lord Scarman.
55 Ibid 418 naming ‘the making of  treaties, the defence of  the realm, the prerogative of  mercy the grant of
honours, the dissolution of  Parliament and the appointment of  ministers’.
56 Ibid 398.
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rule that acts of  the Crown which are done under the prerogative in the sphere of  foreign
affairs are unreviewable’61 – has been diminished. Therefore, as the non-reviewability of
the prerogative in general, and that relating to foreign affairs in particular, has been
chipped away at, so too has the possibility of  a successful invocation of  the non-
justiciability element of  Crown act of  state. Two points can be made about Leggatt J’s
treatment of  the issue: first of  all, though commendable from the point of  view of
principle, it is in large part the result of  changing attitudes as to the appropriate
relationship of  courts and executive which are too well embedded to have been
challenged here, rather than any initiative of  the judge’s own. Second, the question of
how the tortious conduct is framed – whether it can be conceptualised as a particular
decision which is itself  justiciable in an English court, rather than as an aspect of  a
decision which directly reflects high policy – becomes vital to the question of  whether the
non-justiciability element of  Crown act of  state can be successfully pleaded. Here, it is
accepted that the decision which challenged it was not one of  high policy; it is not
something which is ‘not cognisable by the court’, as Lord Pearson put it in Nissan.62
Instead, the relevant decision was that to detain a particular individual and, Leggatt J
notes, rather than being the sort of  decision for which the courts are ill-equipped, the
legality of  detention is ‘quintessentially a matter for the court’.63 As such, he concluded
on this point, ‘insofar as the Crown act of  state doctrine rests on a principle of
justiciability, the doctrine has no application in the present case’.64 Having been in this
way brought up to date in Serdar Mohammed, the non-justiciability element of  the doctrine
was at first instance held to be similarly incapable of  repelling the claims brought by
Rahmatullah.65
Much of  the admirable clarity of  Leggatt J’s judgment on this point is missing from
the Court of  Appeal’s reasoning in arriving at the same conclusion as did he. That court
says nothing of  the prerogative and instead incorporates an inconclusive discussion of
the Supreme Court’s consideration of  non-justiciability in Shergill v Khaira – a
consideration which implicitly distinguishes the act of  state doctrine from non-
justiciability proper but which seems to identify that doctrine with the tort defence limb66
– and elements of  the decision of  the Court of  Appeal in Al-Jedda (No 2), discussed
further below. The overall effect of  these considerations seems to be to leave the non-
justiciability rule where it had been left by Leggatt J, in that it prevents the consideration
by the courts of  ‘high level policy’ decisions, in relation to which there may be no judicial
standards available for application by the courts, or where it would be constitutionally
inappropriate for the courts to enquire into the matter:67 the manner in which these
considerations interact is, however, not explored. More significant is the apparent shift in
the basis of  the non-justiciability rule from the rules as to the reviewability of  the
prerogative on the one hand to that of  the general issue of  justiciability on the other. This
shift leaves ambiguous the question of  what sort of  non-justiciability is at issue in Crown
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act of  state. The point can be made with reference to the two categories of  non-
justiciability identified by the Supreme Court in Shergill v Khaira and reiterated by the Court
of  Appeal here. The first such category includes circumstances in which ‘the issue in
question is beyond the constitutional competence assigned to the courts under our
conception of  the separation of  powers’, such as in relation to the transactions of  foreign
states and proceedings in Parliament.68 In this category, ‘once the forbidden area is
identified, the court may not adjudicate on the matters within it, even if  it is necessary to
do so in order to decide some other issue which is itself  unquestionably justiciable’.69 By
contrast, in the second category, ‘comprising claims or defences which are based neither
on private legal rights or obligations, nor on reviewable matters of  public law’, this
inability to look past the non-justiciability of  the matter does not apply. Instead, the
courts will adjudicate upon the matter if  ‘a justiciable legitimate expectation or a
Convention right depends on it’ as it will also in the case of  private law liabilities.70 A key
example, the Supreme Court said in Shergill, is that in which ‘the court declines to
adjudicate on the international acts of  foreign state or to review the exercise of  the
Crown’s prerogative in the conduct of  foreign affairs’.71
Though the Supreme Court in Shergill had, as noted above, implicitly distinguished the
Crown act of  state doctrine from non-justiciability proper, it would seem to logically
follow that one or other of  these positions must be the case for that doctrine to the extent
it is based upon a non-justiciability rule. The references by the Supreme Court, in relation
to that second category, to the prerogative, the rule against the reviewability of  which has
often been identified (as by Leggatt J in Serdar Mohammmed) with the non-justiciability limb
of  Crown act of  state, give some weak basis for thinking that the Crown act of  state non-
justiciability rule works as does the second category of  general non-justiciability identified
in Shergill. Nevertheless, the better view must (unfortunately) be that the non-justiciability
element of  Crown act of  state, where it operates, does so in the same manner as in the
first category of  non-justiciability in Shergill. Most clear, and probably dispositive of  the
question, is that where it comes to discuss the compatibility of  the act of  state doctrine
with Article 6 of  the Convention on Human Rights, the Court of  Appeal makes specific
reference to the first category of  non-justiciability, noting that it is ‘not concerned in this
case with the second category of  non-justiciability identified by the Supreme Court . . . as
the claimants seek to invoke private law rights’.72 This conclusion is buttressed by the
Supreme Court’s references in Shergill to transactions of  foreign states (the original subject
of  the act of  state doctrine) and to the separation of  powers, which Leggatt J had
identified as the basis of  the non-justiciability rule in Serdar Mohammed.73 Finally, this
conclusion would seem to follow from a consideration of  the basic logic of  the situation:
if  the non-justiciability rule is equivalent to the Supreme Court’s second category of  non-
justiciability in Shergill, then that limb of  Crown act of  state has been hollowed out even
further than Leggatt J suggested has been the case, to the point that it is not clear that it
could ever actually prevent the courts from hearing a case, no matter how grand the
questions of  foreign (or other) policy upon which it would require the court to adjudicate.
The effect of  assimilating the non-justiciability rule of  Crown act of  state to this first
category of  general non-justiciability is that the court cannot enter a ‘forbidden area’ even
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if  to do so is necessary in order to decide private law rights, a conclusion which gives
further reason for believing that the act giving rise to the tort should be framed as
narrowly as is plausible, so as to keep it – if  at all possible – outside the realm of  non-
justiciability. When the matter is considered by the Supreme Court it would do well to
consider splitting the difference, by distinguishing the different factors identified by the
Court of  Appeal as rendering a matter non-justiciable – briefly, the need to consider
questions of  high policy, the absence of  judicial standards and questions of  constitutional
appropriateness – and assimilating only the third of  these to the first category of  non-
justiciability identified in Shergill. In relation to the first factor in particular, there is no
reason to believe that it alone justifies the courts refusing to consider a matter where it is
necessary for them to do so in order to determine an individual’s legal rights. It should
be, therefore, brought within the second category of  Shergill non-justiciability. If  this sort
of  differentiation in turn encourages the courts to clarify what are the various bases of
non-justiciability and the manner in which they interact, then so much the better.
This apparent shift in the explanation of  the non-justiciability limb of  Crown act of
state raises further questions about Crown act of  state, justiciability and the prerogative.
First, does the shift indicate that the non-justiciability limb of  the Crown act of  state
doctrine is not limited to circumstances in which the act giving rise to the tort claim is
carried out under the prerogative powers (and has therefore been increased in scope)?
This point is subtle. The reason why the two matters have often been conflated is that, to
the extent that non-justiciability arises in the context of  foreign affairs, it applies to
powers which in the modern constitution are found entirely within the prerogative.
Nevertheless, the approach which the courts have taken to reviewability in the prerogative
case law is, as discussed, now unambiguous: reviewability is a function of  the subject
matter of  a power rather than its legal source. There is, therefore, it seems, no longer any
basis for distinguishing between the question of  justiciability as regards the prerogative
and as regards other sources of  legal authority. In turn, this suggests that, though the
Crown act of  state non-justiciability rule has often been thought of  as an instantiation of
the prerogative’s non-reviewability, it might apply equally beyond the prerogative. In fact,
the best understanding may be that the prerogative was never truly non-justiciable per se,
but instead that the subject matter of  all or most of  the prerogative powers was non-
justiciable, rendering the prerogative non-justiciable only indirectly and contingently –
what has changed over time has not been the courts’ approach to the review of  the
prerogative, but the range of  subject matters of  which they regard themselves as unable
to take cognisance. If  the significance of  this reconceptualisation by the Court of  Appeal
is only potential rather than actual, it is because there are no powers to conduct foreign
affairs which exist in statute rather than the prerogative – nothing, that is, on which the
now rethought (and so implicitly widened) rule can be brought to bear. Following from
this, a second question: if  this limb of  the doctrine is nothing more than an instantiation
of  the general approach taken by the courts to the question of  justiciability, what reason
is there for separating it out and packaging it as an aspect of  a separate doctrine? The
answer seems to be that there is none. To the extent that it is a rule of  justiciability, the
doctrine of  Crown act of  state adds nothing to, but in fact merely reflects, general
principles of  (non-)justiciability and the understanding of  the appropriate constitutional
separation of  power which underpins them. These principles may ‘bite’ more frequently
on ‘acts of  state’ as Wade understood them, but they will not do so inevitably or
exclusively and any such act will include under its umbrella an infinite number of  lesser
acts which are unambiguously justiciable. The Court of  Appeal has therefore reaffirmed
here the doctrine’s dualism by confirming the existence of  the doctrine’s tort defence
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limb, only to simultaneously offer an understanding of  the non-justiciability limb which
calls that dualism back into question by showing that this first limb is not a rule of  law
special to the Crown. 
To return to the cases at hand, the detention of  Serdar Mohammed was accepted by
the Court of  Appeal, as it had been by the High Court, to be suitably distant from any
decision of  high policy as to be well within the scope of  the courts’ jurisdiction, similar
issues having been already considered in the context of  judicial review claims.74 Because
the adjudication of  Serdar Mohammed’s claims could take place without entry into any
‘forbidden area’, the non-justiciability rule was no bar to it. But despite it having accepted
Leggatt J’s hollowing-out of  the non-justiciability rule, the Court of  Appeal noted the
possibility that, contrary to what had been said at first instance, the claims of
Rahmatullah75 might be caught even by the now-eroded rule. To explain why requires an
understanding of  Al-Jedda v Secretary of  State for Defence,76 a previous case arising out of  the
military action in Iraq and Afghanistan in which Crown act of  state was pleaded. The
claimant had been arrested in Iraq in 2004 and detained by UK forces in a military
detention centre. After his release, he sought damages for unlawful imprisonment. When
Al-Jedda’s tort claim arrived in the Court of  Appeal, the majority took the view that his
detention was lawful under Iraqi law and so his appeal, from the decision of  Underhill J,
was dismissed without any binding decision about Crown act of  state having been made.
Nevertheless, two of  the members of  the Court of  Appeal – Arden LJ, who dissented on
the lawfulness of  the detention under Iraqi law and whose views on Crown act of  state
were therefore dispositive of  the issue for her, and Elias LJ – expressed the view that, as
had been suggested by the judge at first instance, the doctrine of  act of  state in its non-
justiciability form was applicable here, preventing the courts from enquiring into the
legality of  the detention. This view was, however, a function of  the earlier House of
Lords decision in Al-Jedda (No 1)77 that detention for the purpose of  the internal security
of  Iraq was rendered obligatory by UN Security Council Resolutions which, though
couched in the language of  authorisation and not obligation, bound the UK to detain
individuals where it was necessary for the internal security of  Iraq. It was this obligation
which transformed the specific act of  detention from a probably justiciable decision into
one over which the doctrine of  Crown act of  state would have displaced the courts’
jurisdiction.78 It is this same logic – not strictly part of  the ratio of  Al-Jedda (No 2) – which
the Court of  Appeal in Serdar Mohammed/Rahmatullah suggested might have been capable
of  distinguishing Rahmatullah’s detention from that of  Serdar Mohammed, such that the
non-justiciability rule would exclude the consideration of  the former and not the latter. 
Viewed in light of  later decisions, this account of  the application of  Crown act of
state to the facts of  Al-Jedda is problematic. Why does the erosion of  the general rules of
non-justiciability which was accepted in Serdar Mohammed both at first instance and on
appeal not similarly place the specific decision to detain Al-Jedda firmly back within the
courts’ purview, given the distance between the decision to take military action and the
decision to detain the particular individual? As noted by Leggatt J in Rahmatullah, ‘[i]t was
not necessary to challenge the decision to send British forces to Iraq in order to judge
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whether the detention of  Mr Al-Jedda was lawful under Iraqi law’.79 But even if  the
principle of  the issue were – contrary to the view taken by Leggatt J in Serdar Mohammed
and in Rahmatullah and endorsed on appeal80 – unimpeachable, the conclusion is built
upon a shaky foundation. The House of  Lords’ decision in Al-Jedda (No 1) that the
claimant’s detention was not merely authorised but required by the UN Security Council
resolutions, and his rights under Article 5 of  the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) were therefore ousted (by virtue of  the UN Charter’s subordination of  all other
international legal obligations to the writ of  the UN),81 was called into question by the
decision of  the European Court of  Human Rights in Strasbourg. It was there held that,
contrary to the House of  Lords’ assessment, ‘neither Resolution 1546 nor any other
United Nations Security Council Resolution explicitly or implicitly required the UK to
place an individual whom its authorities considered to constitute a risk to the security of
Iraq into indefinite detention without charge’.82 If  accepted by the domestic courts, this
assessment would break the link, upon which the relevant remarks in the Court of
Appeal’s decision in Al-Jedda (No 2) are predicated, between the indisputably non-
justiciable choice to contribute British forces to the Multi-National Force in Iraq and the
specific act of  detaining Al-Jedda. Though it is the House of  Lords’ decision which
continues to bind the domestic courts, the Supreme Court has given permission to appeal
to a case (in respect of  which Leggatt J granted a leapfrog certificate)83 which challenges
the decision of  the House of  Lords on the UN point. If  that claim succeeds, the defence
of  act of  state as the majority of  the Court of  Appeal in Al-Jedda (No 2) would have
applied it will be unavailable in relation to the detention of  individuals in Iraq, the
decision to detain not being attributable to an overriding obligation arising from the UN
Charter. Leggatt J therefore suggested in Rahmatullah that, insofar as it is necessary to
explain it, Al-Jedda should be explained (contrary to the terms in which it was in fact
decided) ‘on the basis of  the narrower Crown act of  state defence rather than by invoking
the rule of  justiciability’.84 This conclusion was endorsed by the Court of  Appeal in the
joined cases: the ‘observations in Al-Jedda on the applicability of  the act of  state principle
cannot be justified on grounds of  non-justiciability’.85 As such, the possible distinction
floated between the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq was illusory and the (eroded) non-
justiciability rule failed also to exclude the consideration of  Rahmatullah’s claim. 
To conclude on the non-justiciability rule: the overall effect of  this element of  the
recent series of  decisions will be to deprive the rule of  much of  its practical effect. That
is, though it is accepted that matters of  high policy remain non-justiciable, it will not
always, or even usually, be the case that, where a tort claim is advanced, the specific action
or decision allegedly giving rise to it will exist in a sufficiently close nexus with such
matters as to be similarly excluded. Indeed, such a situation may, in fact, be highly
exceptional. Instead, a litigant will be challenging the specific action which affects him or
her as an individual, which the courts will usually and rightly characterise as a separate act,
capable of  being adjudicated upon by the courts without them carrying out any
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illegitimate foray into the conduct of  foreign policy, which, they recognise, remains the
exclusive province of  the executive.86 Though there undoubtedly exists, at least in theory,
a category of  actions or decisions which are capable of  giving rise to a claim in tort but
which are in fact themselves by nature non-justiciable, that category is likely to be small,
and the smaller it is, the less significant is the non-justiciability rule of  Crown act of  state.
More fundamentally, however, the treatment of  the issue in the Court of  Appeal suggests
that it is no longer sensible to consider the non-justiciability rule as an aspect of  some
special doctrine of  Crown act of  state and so to focus attention on what is or is not such
an act. It is an instantiation of  general principles of  justiciability which are not unique in
their application to the Crown, to the prerogative, or even to those acts traditionally
designated ‘acts of  state’. To conceive it as such makes room for a more determined focus
upon those general principles.
The tort defence
The cumulative effect of  the cases which are the subject of  this article has been to erode
the tort defence rule of  Crown act of  state to at least the same extent as the non-
justiciability rule. The basis of  that erosion is, however, more direct and deliberate, being
the conscious effect of  those cases rather than – as was mostly the case with the non-
justiciability rule – merely the effect of  bringing to bear upon it several decades of
evolution elsewhere in the constitutional order. As noted, the separate existence of  this
second rule was confirmed, in the face of  direct challenge to it, by both the High Court
and Court of  Appeal. Yet that rule, though so closely tied to the non-justiciability rule as
to subsist within the same doctrine, must – if  it is not to be considered to have been
undermined in the same way, and for the same reasons, as has been that first rule – not
only be something other than a mere instantiation of  the non-justiciability rule, but have
a separate basis from it altogether; one which survives the constitutional developments of
GCHQ and Bancoult and so on. The basis identified by Leggatt J in Serdar Mohammed was
that, in the field of  foreign relations, court and executive should speak with ‘one voice’87
– though in relation to the rights and liberties of  the subject at home, the courts may and
indeed must protect the individual against the executive, very different considerations
apply in the field of  foreign affairs, such that the individual has no expectation to be
protected against unlawful executive action.88 This would not prevent the courts applying
domestic public law principles to actions taken by agents of  the UK in Afghanistan, but,
he said, ‘[i]t is not the business of  the English court to enforce against the UK state rights
arising under Afghan law for acts done on the authority of  the UK government abroad,
where to do so would undercut the policy of  the executive arm of  the UK state in
conducting foreign military operations’.89 The Crown act of  state doctrine is on this view
(re-)conceptualised as an exception to the general principle permitting foreign torts to be
the basis of  a claim in domestic courts where the foreign law is the applicable law,
analogous to the rule whereby English courts will refuse to enforce a right arising under
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foreign law if  to do so is contrary to public policy: ‘its effect is to preclude the
enforcement of  that tort claim in the courts of  this country’.90 Leggatt J was at pains to
emphasise how narrow is the rule on the basis of  which the tort claim here fails: it applies
‘only to executive acts done abroad pursuant to deliberate UK foreign policy’; those
‘which are directly authorised or ratified by the UK government’.91 But the decision to
detain Serdar Mohammed was such an act: the defence of  act of  state succeeded there,92
as it would have also on the approach of  the High Court in Rahmatullah, if  it could be
shown that his arrest and detention was in accordance with the UK’s detention policy.93
Because it may yet prove relevant, several points can be made as regards this
conceptualisation of  the public policy underlying the choice of  laws rule. The first is that
it demonstrates what we may have already suspected: there is no coherence whatsoever to
the doctrine of  Crown act of  state, the two rules of  which are wholly separate from each
other and contingently combined under an umbrella term which can now be seen to be
deeply misleading. The second is that it is poorly grounded in the case law – in evidencing
it Leggatt J relied not on anything said in the various Crown act of  state cases but instead
on the characterisation of  Buron v Denman found in a textbook on the conflict of  laws,
providing an account of  the rule which does not unambiguously follow from the terms
of  the case.94 A third point: the cases cited in relation to the one-voice principle speak
primarily to a different set of  circumstances – that where the executive has an official
opinion on a question which must be taken to be an opinion of  the state as a whole and
with which it makes no sense for the courts to disagree. The paradigmatic example is the
question of  whether a certain state exists, as was at issue in Government of  the Republic of
Spain v SS ‘Arantzazu Mendi’.95 Here, instead, insofar as there is a relevant question on
which the executive and the courts might disagree, it is a question of  law, and who but
the courts are entitled to form an authoritative view on such a question? To take such a
view and then discard it as a matter of  policy is an unfortunate extension of  the one-voice
principle which provides an unattractive incentive for the executive to act in a way that it
knows – as it did here – to be unlawful. Fourth, the conceptualisation of  the act of  state
offered here would seem to be in tension with the claim made by Leggatt J in Rahmatullah
that, despite what was argued there, not only does the defence exist, but that it ‘rests on
a proper appreciation of  the separation of  powers’.96 If  courts choose, even in a limited
field, to speak as they are mandated to do by the executive, then what is taking place is
not an actualisation of  the separation of  powers ideal but its denial. Fifth, and finally, the
explanation of  the tort defence offered by Leggatt J at first instance is not just a merely
technical clarification of  the rule’s basis. Had it been accepted by the Court of  Appeal, it
would have widened the scope of  the overall doctrine of  Crown act of  state. We can make
the point by considering the invocation of  Crown act of  state in Nissan v Attorney General,
which failed because the taking of  the hotel was not sufficiently closely connected to an
‘act of  state’ (the making of  an agreement with Cyprus) for it to fall within the non-
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justiciability rule. However, applied to those same facts, the tort defence would, on the
approach of  Leggatt J here, have succeeded: the taking of  the hotel may not have been
an act of  state or suitably closely connected to one, but was presumably nevertheless
within the category of  ‘executive acts done abroad pursuant to deliberate UK foreign
policy’.97 What this suggests is that, though the combined decisions of  Leggatt J in Serdar
Mohammed and Rahmatullah weakened the non-justiciability rule (having the desirable effect
of  asserting the courts’ jurisdiction over acts which would previously have escaped it), the
range of  actions in respect of  which tort claims would be barred by Crown act of  state
was in fact widened by them. This must be counted as both perverse and retrogressive. 
These points are, however, of  less significance than they might have been as a result
of  the decision of  the Court of  Appeal that, though this limb of  the act of  state doctrine
is indeed a procedural rule of  domestic law reflecting public policy, the public policy
considerations must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and, as such, the tort defence will
not succeed simply because the conduct giving rise to the claim is ‘a sovereign act done
abroad pursuant to deliberate foreign policy’.98 This conclusion is justified in part on the
basis that there does not exist a similar bar in relation to public law claims (and nor is the
defence available in relation to claims under the HRA), and in part on the sense that the
tort defence as conceptualised by Leggatt J was simply out of  place – ‘no longer
sustainable’ – in the modern constitutional context.99 Drawing an intriguing comparison
between the tort defence of  the Crown act of  state doctrine and the law on public interest
immunity before and after Conway v Rimmer,100 the Court of  Appeal held that, in deciding
whether the defence should be available, the courts should consider ‘whether, in the
particular factual circumstances of  the case, there are any compelling considerations of
public policy which would require the court to deny a claim in tort founded on an act of
the Executive performed abroad’.101 We can, it seems, understand from this that the
default situation will be that the tort defence does not apply even to acts done pursuant to
a deliberate foreign policy – only where sufficient justification is given to depart from that
default will the executive convince the courts to bar the tort claim in question. Moreover,
it seems that even any compelling considerations identified in favour of  barring a tort
claim would require to be balanced against countervailing considerations in favour of
rejecting the defence: it was accepted by the Secretary of  State that claims for torture
could not be repelled on this basis,102 while the Court of  Appeal took the view that the
tort defence, as a reflection of  public policy, is unlikely to be capable of  successful
invocation ‘if  the conduct in issue constituted a grave breach of  international law or
human rights law’.103 Having rejected the specific public policy rationale identified by
Leggatt J, the Court of  Appeal has deprived the executive of  the ability to bar certain
claims on the basis of  little more than its mere say-so. As a correlate, it has acquired for
the courts a new decision-making authority, according to which it will determine whether
or not the reasons offered for seeking to bar certain tort claims are suitably compelling.
The decision of  the Court of  Appeal therefore neatly fits the pattern of  administrative
law in the last half-century or so, whereby the courts have slowly but surely rewritten
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notions of  constitutional appropriateness, dismantled distinctions which exempted
certain executive acts from judicial oversight, and intensified standards of  review so as to
obtain greater scope to subject to scrutiny the actions of  the executive even in its most
precious policy areas and to require, as a condition of  any attempt to avoid that scrutiny,
that the executive justify itself  to the courts. 
More than that, however, in thus narrowing the tort defence the Court of  Appeal has
given reason to doubt the usefulness of  conceptualising the rule as the aspect of  an
overarching doctrine known as Crown act of  state. That is, unlike in the case of  the
doctrine as understood by Leggatt J, which stays largely true to the past understanding of
the rule’s effect (if  not its nature), the Court of  Appeal has held that just because an act
was done by the Crown in pursuit of  its foreign policy does not mean a claim arising out
of  it will be barred. Not only is this not a sufficient condition, however: neither is it a
necessary one. The same public policy considerations which may bar a claim based on
foreign law in relation to an ‘act of  state’ may similarly bar a claim which does not involve
any such thing: the rule, we now see, is merely a general rule of  public policy which is a
well-known feature of  the choice of  laws and which is acknowledged within the 1995 Act
by a saving provision which provides that nothing in the relevant part ‘authorises the
application of  the law of  a country outside the forum as the applicable law for
determining issues arising in any claim in so far as to do so . . . would conflict with
principles of  public policy’.104 At first instance, Leggatt J had suggested that his own
understanding of  the tort defence was analogous with this rule. The better view, the
decision of  the Court of  Appeal shows, is that it is simply a manifestation of  it, one
which does not apply uniquely, or even specially, to the Crown: it would bar a claim of  the
sort at issue in Buron v Denman, but would (in present circumstances) do so even if  the
defendant was a private party rather than the Crown, given that the enforcement of
property rights in slaves would undoubtedly be contrary to public policy. Though the
public policy considerations which apply to alleged acts of  state may be different, or apply
with different weight, the balancing act the courts must undertake is a familiar one, not
unique to such acts. In clarifying and narrowing the rule, these judgments have therefore
clearly demonstrated that it no longer, if  it ever did, makes sense to think of  a distinct
doctrine of  Crown act of  state – better to think of  two rules, one of  justiciability, one of
the choice of  laws, which will apply (but not exclusively) to certain acts of  the Crown,
either preventing the courts from adjudicating upon those acts, or barring tort claims
arising out of  them. To continue to treat the doctrine as something distinct and special –
as reflecting a privileged legal status of  either the Crown or certain of  its acts – would be
to wrongly reify it and would obstruct a clear view of  what should and will be the legal
consequences of  the acts of  the Crown abroad. 
Where at first instance the tort defence had been held to bar the claims of  both Serdar
Mohammed and Rahmatullah, the tighter understanding of  public policy – to be
considered on a case-by-case rather than blanket basis – endorsed by the Court of  Appeal
leads to very different results. In the case of  Mohammed, having emphasised the
Secretary of  State’s decision to authorise a detention policy ‘outside and contrary to the
authority’ granted by the UN Security Council Resolutions and contrary to Afghan law, as
well as his failure to put proposals for legislation barring tort claims of  this sort (as had
been done in the USA), the court held that it could see no ‘compelling considerations of
public policy which should prevent reliance on Afghan law as the basis of  the claims in
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tort brought in these proceedings’.105 That is, where Leggatt J’s understanding of  public
policy caused Mohammed’s claim to be barred, the new, stricter approach of  the Court of
Appeal means that it can proceed. For Rahmatullah and the Iraqi civilian claimants, the
result was ambiguous (though still more favourable to the claimants than that of  the High
Court) in that the question of  where the balance of  public policy considerations lay was
left open for determination at trial. It is clear, however, that a key factor in that decision
will be whether or not the UK was under an overriding obligation, arising out of  Security
Council resolutions, to detain or intern ‘for reasons of  security’ in Iraq.106 As discussed
above in the context of  the Al-Jedda case, that question will soon be revisited by the
Supreme Court. If  it follows the Strasbourg Court in holding that, contrary to its own
decision in Al-Jedda (No 1), the UK was under no such obligation, it seems likely that the
Crown act of  state defence will ultimately fail in barring the tort claims of  Rahmatullah
and the Iraqi civilians. The Al-Jedda (No 1) issue may, however, ultimately impede
Rahmatullah’s tort claim via the tort defence notwithstanding that the severability of  the
high policy decision to go to war from the specific decision to detain meant that it failed
to do so under the non-justiciability rule.
Two further issues regarding the tort defence were raised for the first time before the
High Court in Rahmatullah and dealt with there and on appeal. The first was the claim that,
even if  the defence of  Crown act of  state had previously existed, it was abolished by the
Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s 2(1) of  which renders the Crown subject to the normal
liabilities in tort in respect of  torts committed by its ‘servants or its agents’, on the
proviso that ‘no proceedings shall lie against the Crown . . . in respect of  any act or
omission of  a servant or agent of  the Crown unless the act or omission would apart from
the provisions of  this Act have given rise to a cause of  action in tort against the servant
or agent or his estate’. It was noted above that the origins of  the doctrine of  Crown act
of  state date to an era, put to an end by the 1947 Act, in which the Crown could do no
wrong; a rule which entailed, for present purposes, that it could not be liable in tort. The
argument advanced here was that the defence of  Crown act of  state was an aspect of  the
Crown’s general immunity in tort and so it, like that more general immunity, was
extinguished by the statutory intervention. Leggatt J at first instance rejected this
claim;107 that the Court of  Appeal endorsed his rejection of  it is, of  course, of  less
significance given that it did so in the context of  a diminished, rather than enhanced, tort
defence.108 More important is the claim that the defence of  Crown act of  state is a
procedural bar which interferes with a claimant’s rights under Article 6 of  the ECHR –
one which, even if  it pursues a legitimate aim, does so in an arbitrary and
disproportionate way. Leggatt J rested his conclusion as to the proportionality of  the
procedural bar – and therefore its compliance with Article 6 – on the limited scope of  the
doctrine, which applies only to acts ‘done abroad pursuant to deliberate UK foreign
policy’, and only to claims arising under foreign law (and so not to HRA claims).109
Nothing in the doctrine prevents any claim being brought in any other jurisdiction, while
it remains open to the claimant to challenge the legality of  the policy in pursuit of  which
the acts were committed on English public law grounds.110 The doctrine’s alleged
disproportionality was attributed in large part to its potential retrospective operation – i.e.
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that it can operate as a defence to tort claims arising out of  actions which were ‘adopted’
subsequent to taking place rather than being authorised in advance, as had happened in
Buron v Denman. This point was left open, however: the actions out of  which
Rahmatullah’s tort claims emerge were carried out pursuant to a policy established in
advance and so there was no need to confirm whether retrospectivity renders the
procedural bar a disproportionate interference with a claimant’s Article 6 rights.111 The
Court of  Appeal, by contrast, treated the two limbs of  the doctrine separately. Though
its conclusions as to the applicability of  the non-justiciability rule rendered the question
of  the rule’s compatibility with Article 6 academic, the court indicated its belief  in that
compatibility, given that the non-justiciability rule, in reflecting ‘limitations on the role of
the judicial function which are inherent in the allocation of  powers under our
constitution’, clearly pursues a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner.112 In arriving at
the same conclusion as to the compatibility of  the tort defence with Article 6 as had
Leggatt J, however, the Court of  Appeal suggested that the tort defence as conceptualised
at first instance would not be compatible: the absolute nature of  the bar would – even if
the one-voice principle were recognised as a legitimate aim – be neither a necessary nor a
proportionate means of  achieving it in light of  the unfettered ability to bring public law
and human rights claims arising out of  the same facts.113 The tort defence was
compatible with Article 6 only because it was rewritten by the Court of  Appeal to reflect
a fact-specific, case-by-case consideration of  public policy. 
Finally, alongside the clear and significant narrowing of  both the non-justiciability rule
and the tort defence, one further issue must be mentioned briefly – the clarification that
neither of  the doctrine’s two rules bars claims under the HRA. This conclusion was
arrived at by Leggatt J on the straightforward basis that act of  state is a feature of  the
common law which ‘has been overridden by Parliament when it enacted the Human
Rights Act’.114 To read into that Act an implied exception to the basic s 6(1) rule in
relation to acts of  state would be incompatible with its purpose and create an unwelcome
divergence between the enforcement of  the ECHR in domestic law and before the
Strasbourg Court, to which the doctrine is of  no relevance.115 The Court of  Appeal
concurred:116 the narrowing of  the doctrine within its traditional domain(s) was therefore
accompanied by a refusal to permit its expansion into other areas of  law. 
Conclusion
The doctrine of  Crown act of  state is much diminished. It is now clear that the non-
justiciability element does not apply to HRA claims, while the tort defence rule permits
both those and public law claims. Even where each of  the doctrine’s rules does apply,
their scope is far more limited than would have been understood until recently. All of  this
is welcome – the very existence of  the doctrine is in tension with the rule of  law and its
progressive limitation is a victory for that idea even if  (as seems possible) it ultimately
encourages Parliament to legislate in order to fill the gap which recent decisions have
opened up. More than that, however, the rethinking of  these rules, which has been
precipitated by military endeavours in Iraq and Afghanistan, calls into question the
coherence of  the doctrine qua doctrine. First, because the two rules comprising the
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doctrine are so different in their basis and their application as to be essentially unrelated.
Second, and more fundamentally, because it is now clear that neither rule is unique in its
application to the Crown or even to those acts traditionally identified as ‘acts of  state’.
The older rule is an instantiation in the field of  foreign affairs of  general principles of
justiciability and non-justiciability which themselves reflect the undeniable fact that some
questions (which, we may debate) are unsuitable for judicial determination. The second is
a rule of  the conflict of  laws reflecting general considerations of  public policy which
require a case-by-case examination of  the relevant act within its specific legal and factual
context. The doctrine has been exposed to the scrutiny of  courts, which have long since
ceased to automatically defer to the executive in the field of  foreign affairs, and it has
been found wanting. It should now be abandoned, so as to allow the difficult questions
of  the separation of  powers and public policy which lurk behind the two rules to take
centre stage.
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